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PRE-MERITS VACATUR: AN EFFICIENT, EQUITABLE,
AND ENVIRONMENTALLY SOUND REMEDY
STUART C. GILLESPIE*
ABSTRACT
Federal agencies are increasingly requesting voluntary
remands of challenged rules, thereby circumventing judicial
review, and avoiding ever having to defend the merits of those rules.
Courts routinely grant these extraordinary requests, often under the
guise of saving judicial resources and giving agencies a second
chance to reconsider. But voluntary remands come at a steep cost,
particularly in the arena of environmental litigation. There,
voluntary remands not only deprive litigants of their day in court,
but can also subject them (and the broader public) to unlawful and
inadequate rules that are causing serious environmental harm.
Courts have long guarded against the inequitable consequences
of voluntary remands by simultaneously vacating the challenged
rules, even prior to a conclusive determination on the merits. That
remedy—also known as pre-merits vacatur—falls well within the
court’s broad equitable authority. It has, however, come under
assault in recent years, particularly from industry groups who
rarely profit from the court’s equitable discretion. So too, the Biden
Administration has questioned the court’s ability to vacate Trumpera environmental regulations on voluntary remand, thereby
prolonging those rules’ adverse environmental impacts. Some legal
commentators have assumed, with little or no analysis, that court’s
lack the authority to order pre-merits vacatur.
This article sets the record straight and provides a complete
defense of the court’s authority to order pre-merits vacatur as a
condition of voluntary remand. The article also refutes misplaced
* Stuart Gillespie is a senior attorney with Earthjustice, a non-profit
environmental law firm. The opinions expressed in this article are his alone.
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attempts to strip courts of that remedial power, which provides a
crucial backstop against agencies’ increasing use of voluntary
remands. Finally, the article provides a compelling policy
justification for remanding and vacating insufficiently protective
environmental rules, as demonstrated by two recent cases that
vacated and remanded Trump-era rules that eliminated longstanding Clean Water Act protections. In both cases, pre-merits
vacatur provided an efficient, equitable, and environmentally
sound remedy.
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INTRODUCTION
President Donald Trump systematically eliminated bedrock
environmental protections by rolling back approximately 100
environmental regulations, including longstanding protections for
clean water, clean air, endangered species, and public health.1 To
prevent irreversible environmental damage, Native American
tribes, State governments, and public interest groups filed dozens
of lawsuits asking courts to set aside and vacate those unlawful
regulations.2 At stake were protections for over half of the nation’s
wetlands,3 critical limits on planet-warming carbon dioxide
emissions from power plants,4 fundamental protections for
threatened and endangered species,5 and air-quality standards
that prevented thousands of premature deaths per year.6
On January 20, 2021, President Joe Biden took office and
inherited these high-stakes cases. On day one, he issued an
executive order declaring the Nation’s commitment to advance
environmental justice, to listen to the science, and to improve
public health and protect our environment.7 To that end, President
Biden directed federal agencies to identify Trump-era rules that
Nadja Popovich et al., The Trump Administration Rolled Back More Than 100
Environmental Rules. Here’s the Full List, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/6VV9-TS9U].
2 Pasqua Yaqui Tribe v. United States EPA, 557 F. Supp. 3d 949, 951 (D. Ariz.
2021) (challenging rule that limited scope of Clean Water Act); In re Clean Water
Act Rulemaking, 568 F. Supp. 3d 1013, 1014 (N.D. Cal. 2021) (challenging Clean
Water Act Certification rule), appeal filed, Case No. 21-16961 (9th Cir. Nov. 22,
2021), stay granted, Louisiana v. Am. Rivers, 142 S. Ct. 1347, 1347 (2022); Sierra
Club v. EPA, 21 F.4th 815, 816 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (challenging standards for ozone
under Clean Air Act); Am. Lung Ass’n v. EPA 985 F.3d 914, 940–41 (D.C. Cir.
2021) (challenging rule that repealed and replaced prior plan for regulating power
plants’ emissions of greenhouse gases to address climate change).
3 See, e.g., Annie Snider, Trump Set to Gut Water Protections, POLITICO (Jan. 14,
2020,
9:33PM),
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/01/14/trump-waterregulation-rollback-099016 [https://perma.cc/L2DY-N2M2] ("The latest Trump
regulation rollback could remove federal safeguards for half the country's
wetlands and millions of miles of streams.”). See Pascua Yaqui Tribe, 568 F. Supp.
3d (challenging rule that limited scope of Clean Water Act that relates to
wetlands).
4 Am. Lung Ass’n, 985 F.3d at 929–30.
5 Center for Biological Diversity v. Haaland, No. 19-cv-05206-JLT, 2022 WL
2444455 (N.D. Cal. July 5, 2022).
6 Popovich, supra note 1 at 5; Sierra Club, 21 F.4th at 816.
7 Exec. Order No. 13990, 86 Fed. Reg. 7037 (Jan. 20, 2021).
1
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warranted reconsideration.8 That months-long process identified
multiple rules that suffered from serious legal flaws and were
causing severe, irreversible harm to the environment with each
passing day.9 The Biden Administration committed to replacing
these rules at some indefinite point in the future.10
At the same time, however, the Administration tried to
insulate those very same rules from judicial rule, thereby locking
in years’ worth of additional environmental injury. The
government’s strategy was deceptively simple. Under the guise of
judicial economy, the Administration repeatedly asked courts to
voluntarily remand Trump-era rules to the agencies and forego a
ruling on the merits of the cases challenging those rules.11 Despite
seeking to terminate these cases, the Administration studiously
avoided addressing the issue of whether the courts should also
vacate the challenged rules on remand—the presumptive remedy

Id.; see also Press Release, White House Briefing Room, Fact Sheet: List of
Agency Actions for Review (Jan. 20, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingroom/statements-releases/2021/01/20/fact-sheet-list-of-agency-actions-forreview/ [https://perma.cc/3VUX-NM6Y] (directing federal agencies to review all
existing regulations, orders, guidance documents, policies, and any other similar
agency actions promulgated, issued, or adopted between January 20, 2017, and
January 20, 2021).
9 Notice of Intention to Reconsider and Revise the Clean Water Act Section 401
Certification Rule, 86 Fed. Reg. 29,541 (June 1, 2021) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 121); Notice of Public Meetings Regarding “Waters of the United States,” 86
Fed. Reg. 41,911, 41,914 (Aug. 4, 2021) (providing a schedule of public meetings
to discuss revising the definition of “waters of the United States”).
10 Notice of Public Meetings Regarding ‘‘Waters of the United States,” 86 Fed.
Reg. at 41,914 (setting up public meetings to revise definition of “waters of the
United States” but not providing a timeline for a proposed or final rule); Notice of
Intention to Reconsider and Revise the Clean Water Act Section 401 Certification
Rule, 86 Fed. Reg. at 29,542 (committing to a proposed revision of the Clean
Water Act Section 401 Certification Rule but not providing a timeline for a final
rule).
11 Pasqua Yaqui Tribe v. United States EPA, 557 F. Supp. 3d 949, 951 (D. Ariz.
2021) (discussing government’s request for voluntary remand of Trump-era
Navigable Waters Protection Rule); In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, No. C 2004636 WHA, 2021 WL 4924844, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2021) (discussing
government’s request for voluntary remand of Clean Water Act Section 401
Certification rule).
8
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under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).12 Instead, the
Government vaguely suggested that the courts could not vacate
the rules absent a merits determination—the very ruling the
agencies sought to prevent through their requests for voluntary
remand.13 These self-serving requests provided the Government
with a win-win solution: a way to avoid litigation over the rules
(voluntary remand) and a way to snatch victory from the jaws of
defeat (without vacatur).
These requests were also deeply inequitable and threatened
serious environmental harm. They would have denied litigants
their day in court, all while subjecting them to additional,
irreversible environmental harm caused by the challenged rules.
Multiple courts rejected that outcome by vacating and remanding
the rules, even prior to a conclusive merits determination.14 The
court’s recognized that vacatur was essential due to the serious
errors in the rules and the need to prevent serious environmental
harm from leaving the flawed rules in place. Even though that
relief falls squarely within the court’s equitable authority, various
industry-led groups have mounted a concerted effort to strip the
courts of this remedial power and leave the public with no recourse
to ongoing, severe environmental destruction.
This article provides a complete defense of the court’s longstanding authority to vacate rules on a motion for voluntary
remand, even without a conclusive merits determination. Part I
starts with an overview of the court’s increasingly permissive
In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, 568 F. Supp. 3d 1013, 1023 (N.D. Cal. 2021)
(explaining that the Environmental Protection Agency “neglected to address why
the instant action is the exception meriting remand without vacatur or why the
default standard of vacatur … should not apply here”); Defendants’ Opposed
Motion for Voluntary Remand of the NWPR Without Vacatur at 13, Pascua Yaqui
Tribe v. EPA, 557 F. Supp. 3d 949 (D. Ariz. 2021) (No. CV-20-00266-TUC-RM),
ECF No. 72 (requesting voluntary remand of Navigable Waters Protection Rule
but neglecting to address why the court should not simultaneously vacate the
rule).
13 Defendants’ Opposition to Business Intervenor’s Motion for Stay Pending
Appeal at *8, Pascua Yaqui Tribe v. EPA, 557 F. Supp. 3d 949 (D. Ariz. 2021) (No.
CV-20-00266-TUC-RM), ECF No. 112 (asserting, without support, that “vacatur
should only be ordered after the court has resolved the merits”).
14 See generally In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, 568 F. Supp. 3d at 1028;
Pascua Yaqui Tribe, 557 F. Supp. 3d at 957; Navajo Nation v. Regan, No. 20-CV602-MV/GJF, 2021 WL 4430466 at *5–6 (D.N.M. Sept. 27, 2021); Center for
Biological Diversity v. Haaland, No. 19-cv-05206-JLT, 2022 WL 2444455 (N.D.
Cal. July 5, 2022).
12
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approach to granting voluntary remands, often in the name of
judicial economy. This framework developed against the backdrop
of the court’s broad authority to vacate the challenged action to
prevent inequitable outcomes on remand. Indeed, this permissive
approach to voluntary remand is workable only if courts retain the
power to couple voluntary remands with vacatur.
Part II focuses on recent attempts to strip courts of their
authority to vacate rules on motions for voluntary remand.
Industry has repeatedly argued that courts are powerless to vacate
rules absent a conclusive merits determination. Under that theory,
courts must instead leave the challenged rules in place on
voluntary remand so that industry can continue to profit at severe
expense to the environment. Although the Biden Administration
has not explicitly adopted these baseless arguments, it has tried to
hand-cuff the courts by presenting them with no option but to leave
flawed rules in place on remand.
Part III documents the courts’ broad equitable authority to
vacate rules on motions for voluntary remand, particularly when
necessary to prevent irreparable environmental harm. This
remedy falls well within the court’s broad and flexible authority to
order such relief as necessary to ensure justice. To guide this
remedial authority, courts have relied on the familiar, two-part
test set forth in Allied-Signal, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission15 to assess the seriousness of the errors in a
challenged rule and the harms of leaving it in place on remand.
That test provides a crucial safeguard to ensure that agencies are
not using voluntary remands as an end-run around the courts or
the APA.
Part IV concludes with a policy justification for vacating and
voluntarily remanding challenged rules prior to a conclusive
merits determination. This equitable remedy is essential in the
context of environmental litigation where leaving a defective rule
in place may risk serious, irreversible harm. It also ensures
litigants access to the courts and provides a crucial counterweight
against the government’s increasing use of voluntary remands to
avoid judicial review. Finally, pre-merits vacatur saves judicial
and administrative resources that would otherwise be spent
litigating a flawed rule the agencies plan to replace. These policy
justifications are at the forefront of two recent decisions vacating
15

Allied-Signal, Inc. v. NRC, 988 F.2d 146, 150–51 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
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PART I. THE RISE OF VOLUNTARY REMANDS
Voluntary remands are a unique and exceptional form of
equitable relief that allows federal agencies to halt, if not
circumvent, judicial review. While courts routinely grant these
requests, they have long recognized (and exercised) their authority
to simultaneously vacate the challenged rules.
A. The Exceptional Remedy of Voluntary Remand
Voluntary remands arise when an administrative agency asks
the court to send a challenged action back to the agency for
reconsideration.17 These requests are characterized by two
primary features. First, they precede a ruling on the merits.18
Indeed, agencies often seek voluntary remands to avoid defending
the merits of the challenged decision.19 Second, voluntary remands
terminate the pending lawsuits.20 Agencies frequently seek not
only a remand of their prior decision, but dismissal of the lawsuit
itself.21
These characteristics transform voluntary remands into an
exceptional form of equitable relief. As one commentator
explained, “no other motion allows a defendant to rid itself of a
lawsuit without refuting its opponent’s legal contentions (as in a

See In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, 568 F. Supp. 3d at 1017, 1021–22;
Pascua Yaqui Tribe, 557 F. Supp. 3d at 952.
17 Joshua Revesz, Voluntary Remands: A Critical Reassessment, 70 ADMIN. L. REV.
361, 366–67 (2018) (defining voluntary remands and explaining how they are
“unique in American Law”).
18 See SKF USA Inc. v. United States, 254 F.3d 1022, 1028–29 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(identifying three scenarios where agency might seek voluntary remand prior to
a merits determination).
19 Revesz, supra note 17, at 370.
20 Id. at 367 (explaining “when a federal court ‘remands’ an agency rulemaking,
it terminates the current action”).
21 When the government seeks voluntary remand, it also often requests dismissal
of the case. Pascua Yaqui Tribe, 557 F. Supp. 3d at 957 (granting government’s
request for voluntary remand and dismissal of claims challenging Navigable
Waters Protection Rule).
16
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motion to dismiss) or without the opposing party’s consent (as in a
settlement).”22
Not surprisingly, there is a strong incentive for agencies to
seek and obtain voluntary remands.23 From a strategic standpoint,
voluntary remands allow agencies to avoid a loss on the merits and
even “snatch a temporary victory from the jaws of potential
defeat.”24 Agencies can also use voluntary remands to sidestep an
adverse ruling on the merits that could tie their hands on
remand.25 In addition, they can save resources otherwise spent
litigating the case and focus instead on a new rulemaking to
reconsider their challenged decision.26
B. Courts Have Developed a Permissive Framework for
Voluntary Remands Against the Backdrop of Vacatur.
Courts have developed a largely permissive approach to
granting voluntary remands, often under the theory of judicial
economy and out of respect for the executive branch.27 This
permissive approach to voluntary remand is workable only if
courts retain the power to couple voluntary remand orders with
vacatur.
The Federal Circuits’ decision in SKF USA Inc. v. United
States, provides an often-cited framework for assessing (and
granting) voluntary remands.28 There, the Federal Circuit
identified five situations where remand would arise, three of which
involve scenarios where an agency might seek voluntary remand
to prematurely end a lawsuit.29
First, the agency might seek remand “because of intervening
events outside of the agency’s control, for example, a new legal
See Revesz, supra note 17, at 367.
Id. at 370–81 (discussing in detail benefits and costs of seeking voluntary
remand).
24 Id. at 370.
25 Id. at 375.
26 SKF USA Inc. v. United States, 254 F.3d 1022, at 1029 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(explaining that “remand may conserve judicial resources, or the agency’s views
on the statutory question, though not dispositive, may be useful to the reviewing
court”).
27 See Revesz, supra note 17, at 385–89 (exploring doctrinal roots of voluntary
remand).
28 SKF USA Inc., 254 F.3d at 1027–28.
29 Id. at 1028–29.
22
23
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decision or the passage of new legislation.”30 In such a scenario, the
SKF court explained, remand would normally be required.31
Second, an agency might seek remand (without confessing
error) to reconsider its previous position.32 The agency “might
argue, for example, that it wished to consider further the governing
statute, or the procedures that were followed. It might simply state
that it had doubts about the correctness of its decision.”33 For an
action with this type of posture, the SKF court advised that “if the
agency’s concern is substantial and legitimate, a remand is usually
appropriate.”34 In other words, remand should be granted so long
as “the agency intends to take further action with respect to the
original agency decision on review.”35
Third, “the agency might request a remand because it believes
that its original decision is incorrect on the merits and wishes to
change the result.”36 In this scenario, the SKF court held that
“remand to the agency is required, absent the most unusual
circumstances verging on bad-faith.”37
For all three of these scenarios, SKF either requires or
strongly encourages courts to acquiesce in an agency’s request for
a voluntary remand.38 The court grounded this permissive
approach in Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resource Defense Council,
Inc.,39 explaining agencies are entitled to reconsider their decisions
and should be granted the opportunity to “assess the wisdom of its

Id. at 1028. While SKF identified this as the third situation where the agency
might seek remand, it is the first situation involving voluntary remand and thus,
is labeled as the first scenario in this law review for ease of reading.
31 Id. at 1028–29.
32 Id.
33 SKF USA, 254 F.3d at 1029.
34 Id.; Citizens Against the Pellissippi Parkway Extension, Inc. v. Mineta, 375
F.3d 412, 417 (6th Cir. 2004) (“If the agency’s concern is substantial and
legitimate, a remand is usually appropriate.” (quoting SKF USA, 254 F.3d at
1029)).
35 Limnia, Inc. v. DOE, 857 F.3d 379, 386 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
36 SKF USA, 254 F.3d at 1029.
37 Id. at 1029–30; Cal. Cmtys. Against Toxics v. EPA, 688 F.3d 989, 992 (9th Cir.
2012) (“Generally, courts only refuse voluntarily requested remand when the
agency’s request is frivolous or made in bad faith.” (quoting SKF USA., 254 F.3d
at 1029)).
38 SKF USA, 254 F.3d at 1029.
39 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
30
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policy on a continuing basis.”40 The court also justified this
approach on the grounds of saving judicial resources.41
Other courts adopted this permissive approach to voluntary
remands based on a clear understanding of their broad authority
to simultaneously vacate the challenged agency action.42 At the
time of SKF, the D.C. Circuit had made clear that remand with
vacatur was the presumptive remedy, only to be avoided after
assessing the severity of the flaws in the rule and the potential
disruptive consequences of vacatur, as demonstrated in AlliedSignal.43 Courts also had a long-standing practice of granting
voluntary remands with vacatur, even prior to a merits
determination.44 No court questioned this authority. To the
contrary, courts underscored their broad authority to condition
voluntary remands to safeguard the plaintiffs’ rights from serious
harm during the remand.45 One court even denied a voluntary
SKF USA, 254 F.3d at 1030.
Id. at 1029; Util. Solid Waste Activities Grp. v. EPA, 901 F.3d 414, 436 (D.C.
Cir. 2018) (“Remand has the benefit of allowing ‘agencies to cure their own
mistakes rather than wasting the courts’ and the parties’ resources reviewing a
record that both sides acknowledge to be incorrect or incomplete.” (quoting Ethyl
Corp. v. Browner, 989 F.2d 522, 524 (D.C. Cir. 1993))); B.J. Alan Co. v. ICC, 897
F.2d 561, 562 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (asserting that “administrative reconsideration
is a more expeditious and efficient means of achieving an adjustment of agency
policy than is resort to the federal courts.” (quoting Commonwealth v. ICC, 590
F.2d 1187, 1194 (D.C. Cir. 1978))).
42 Cal. Cmtys. Against Toxics, 688 F.3d at 992 (approving SKF USA taxonomy
and then analyzing whether to vacate rule on voluntary remand prior to a merits
determination).
43 Allied-Signal, Inc. v. NRC, 988 F.2d 146, 150–51 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (establishing
a two-factor analysis for vacatur, which multiple circuit courts have adopted).
NRDC v. EPA, 808 F.3d 556, 584 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Allied-Signal and
acknowledging that an invalid regulation “need not necessarily be vacated”); Cal.
Cmtys. Against Toxics,, 688 F.3d at 989 (9th Cir. 2012); Cent. Maine Power Co. v.
FERC, 252 F.3d 34, 48 (1st Cir. 2001) (citing Allied-Signal and acknowledging
that the court is “not required automatically to set aside an inadequately
explained order”).
44 See WORZ, Inc. v. FCC, 268 F.2d 889, 890 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (remanding and
vacating an order of the FCC); Gen. Signal Corp. v. EPA, No. 90-1560, 1993 WL
183999, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 16, 1993) (summarily granting motion for voluntary
remand and vacatur); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. FERC, No. 04-1122, 2004 WL
2672300, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 22, 2004).
45 NRDC v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 703 n.59 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (“Even where the court
stays its hand as to a determination of the merits, it may grant relief pendente
lite to safeguard plaintiff’s rights from irreparable injury during the pendency of
40
41
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remand in an environmental case because “EPA made no offer to
vacate the rule; thus EPA’s proposal would have left petitioners
subject to a rule [the challengers] claimed was invalid.”46
The SKF framework was thus built on the court’s longstanding authority and practice of vacating agency actions on
remand, even prior to a merits determination. Indeed, SKF
implicitly adopted Professor Toni Fine’s balancing test for
assessing voluntary remands,47 which recognized the court’s
authority to vacate rules as a necessary safeguard or condition of
voluntary remands.48
In the wake of SKF, courts continued to exercise their
authority to vacate rules on motions for voluntary remand.49
Courts viewed this approach as essential to prevent irreversible
environmental harm on remand, such as where the challenged rule

administrative review.”); Tyler v. Fitzsimmons, 990 F.2d 28, 32 n.3 (1st Cir. 1993)
(“[A] reviewing court . . . possesses the ‘inherent’ authority to condition its remand
order as it deems appropriate.” (citing Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 101–
02 (1991)).
46 Chlorine Chemistry Council v. EPA, 206 F.3d 1286, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
47 See Revesz, supra note 17, at 387 (explaining that SKF USA implicitly adopted
Fine’s balancing test).
48 Toni M. Fine, Agency Requests for “Voluntary” Remand: A Proposal for the
Development of Judicial Standards, 28 ARIZ. STATE L.J. 1079, 1130 (1996) (“When
granting a request for remand, the court should consider whether it would be
appropriate to order a stay of the effectiveness of the challenged agency action, or
some other form of interim relief, pending final agency action on remand.
Appropriate interim relief would minimize the risk of injury to the parties and
the public by continued application of agency action that may later be found to be
unlawful, review of which had been delayed at the urging of the agency.”).
49 See Safer Chemicals, Healthy Families v. EPA, 791 F. App’x 653, 656 (9th Cir.
2019); In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, 568 F. Supp. 3d at 1029–29; Pascua
Yaqui v. EPA, 557 F. Supp. 3d at 957; Navajo Nation v. Regan, 20-CV-602MV/GJF, 2021 WL at 4430466, at *3 (D.N.M. Sept. 27, 2021); All. for Wild Rockies
v. Marten, CV 17-21-M-DLC, 2018 WL 2943251, at *4 (D. Mont. June 12, 2018);
ASSE Int’l, Inc. v. Kerry, 182 F. Supp. 3d 1059, 1065 (C.D. Cal. 2016); Ctr. for
Native Ecosystems v. Salazar, 795 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1243 (D. Colo. 2011); see also
N. Coast Rivers All. v. DOI, 1:16-cv-00307-LJO-MJS, 2016 WL 8673038, at *6, 13
(E.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2016) (acknowledging authority to vacate rule on motion for
voluntary remand but declining to do so after balancing equities); NRDC v. DOI,
275 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1143 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (holding that “the same equitable
analysis for vacatur of the rules” applies on motions for voluntary remand, but
declining to exercise that equitable authority).
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eliminated crucial environmental protections.50 Agencies, in turn,
recognized the need to limit any harms during remand by seeking
vacatur themselves51 or suspending their actions pending further
reconsideration.52 In this way, the courts and agencies achieved an
equilibrium: the agency could seek and likely obtain a voluntary
remand to reconsider a challenged rule, but it was not a cost-free
strategy. If the agency did not take steps to limit the harms on
remand, such as by requesting vacatur of the rule, the courts could
and would vacate those rules, especially where necessary to
safeguard the public interest and environment.
PART II. RECENT ATTEMPTS TO STRIP COURTS OF THEIR
EQUITABLE AUTHORITY TO GRANT VOLUNTARY REMAND WITH
VACATUR
In recent years, industry groups have attempted to curtail the
court’s authority to vacate rules on voluntary remand because that
equitable discretion rarely profits industry’s bottom line. So too,
the Biden Administration has attempted to sidestep, if not deny,
the court’s authority to vacate rules on voluntary remand.
A.

Industry’s Efforts to Curtail the Courts’ Authority to
Voluntarily Remand and Vacate Challenged Rules.

Industry rarely profits from the court’s equitable authority to
vacate rules on voluntary remand. The reason is simple: the
equities almost always favor protecting the environment from

See Pasqua Yaqui Tribe v. United States EPA, 557 F. Supp. 3d 949, 955 (D.
Ariz. 2021) (“remanding without vacatur would risk serious environmental
harm”); In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, 568 F. Supp. 3d 1013, 1027 (N.D. Cal.
2021) (finding that “significant environmental harms will likely transpire should
remand occur without vacatur”).
51 See Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. EPA, 562 F.3d 1116 (10th Cir. 2009) (seeking
voluntary remand and vacatur of challenged rule); see also infra note 185
(collecting examples where agencies sought voluntary remand coupled with
vacatur).
52 See Sierra Club v. Van Antwerp, 560 F. Supp. 2d 21, 25 (D.D.C. 2008)
(explaining that “the permit’s suspension in effect removes the potential harm” of
voluntary remand).
50
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irreparable harm.53 Courts thus routinely vacate rules that
eliminate environmental protections, thereby preventing any
further environmental injury on remand.54 While courts can leave
flawed rules in place on remand, they only do so in limited
circumstances, such as where the rule provides safeguards
necessary to prevent environmental injury.55
By contrast, courts rarely leave agency rules in place to protect
profits, especially when that comes at the expense of the
environment. As courts have noted, industry has “no inherent
right to maximize revenues.”56 Courts have thus questioned
whether they can even consider lost profits in assessing whether
to vacate a rule on remand.57 Even where businesses can identify
a potential economic harm due to vacatur, it rarely rises to the

Pollinator Stewardship Council v. EPA, 806 F.3d 532–33 (9th Cir. 2015)
(vacating a challenged rule and leaving the rule in place “risks more potential
environmental harm than vacating it”); Idaho Farm Bureau Fed’n v. Babbitt, 58
F.3d 1392, 1405–06 (9th Cir. 1995) (choosing not to vacate because vacatur would
risk potential extinction of a snail); Cal. Cmtys. Against Toxics v. EPA, 688 F.3d
989, 994 (9th Cir. 2012) (choosing not to vacate because vacatur could lead to air
pollution).
54 See e.g. In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, 568 F. Supp. 3d 1013 (N.D. Cal.
2021).
55 See id.; see also Sierra Club v. EPA, 167 F.3d 658, 664 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (leaving
a “hopelessly irrational” air-quality standard in place on remand so as to avoid a
regulatory void); Nat’l Lime Ass’n v. EPA, 233 F.3d 625, 635 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(leaving an air-quality standard in place on remand to ensure some protection of
the environment).
56 N. Plains Res. Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 460 F. Supp. 3d 1030, 1047
(D. Mont. 2020).
57 See Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 734 F. Supp. 2d 948, 953 (N.D. Cal. 2010)
(“[I]t is not clear that economic consequences is a factor the Court may consider
in environmental cases”); NRDC v. DOI, 275 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1146 n.21(C.D.
Cal. 2002) (noting the “differences in character” between the potential irreversible
environmental harm and any potential economic harm to private developers);
NRDC v. EPA, 676 F. Supp. 2d 307, 317 n.10 (S.D.N.Y.2009) (questioning whether
economic considerations may be given any weight in a decision regarding whether
to vacate insecticide registrations by the EPA). Other courts have considered
economic harms in their equitable calculus, while noting that environmental
laws, such as the Clean Water Act, often impose “inherent economic effects.” In
re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, 568 F. Supp. 3d 1013, 1028 (N.D. Cal. 2021).
Courts of appeals have thus “focused more on environmental consequences when
considering whether to vacate [environmental] rules,” than economic impacts.”
Id.
53
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level of irreparable harm that would outweigh environmental
concerns and thereby warrant vacatur.58
Given that the equities are stacked in favor of protecting the
environment, industry has repeatedly attempted to strip courts of
their power to vacate rules on voluntary remand.59 That would
force courts to leave rules in place whenever they grant voluntary
remands. That outcome benefits industry where the challenged
rule eliminates environmental protections and reduces compliance
costs, thereby increasing profits.
The timber industry pursued this strategy in Carpenters
Industrial Council v. Salazar, a case that arose out of the timber
wars in the Pacific Northwest.60 The case challenged an
Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) rule that stripped protections
from over 1.5 million acres of forested lands that were critical to
the survival and recovery of the northern spotted owl.61 The
government confessed legal error after the Inspector General
found the rule was potentially the product of improper political
interference.62 Rather than defending the rule, the Government
sought a voluntary remand with vacatur—a remedy that would
have restored prior protections for the species while the
government spent the next 24 months formulating a new rule.63
The court found that it was obligated to grant the
government’s request for voluntary remand due to the “substantial
and legitimate concerns” about the rulemaking process.64 But the
court was not “persuaded” it could vacate the rule on remand.65
Unable to explain why it lacked that equitable authority, the court
adopted the timber industry’s argument that vacating the rule
“would allow the Federal defendants to do what they cannot do
In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, 568 F. Supp. 3d (rejecting industry’s
arguments about economic harms counseling against vacatur and explaining that
“harm is one thing, irreparable harm another”); but see Cal. Cmtys. Against
Toxics, 688 F.3d at 994 (declining to vacate air quality plan because doing so could
result in additional air pollution and “also be economically disastrous”).
59 In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, 568 F. Supp. 3d at 1021; Carpenters Indus.
Council v. Salazar, 734 F. Supp. 2d 126, 136 n.9 (D.D.C. 2010); Nat’l Parks
Conservation Ass’n v. Salazar, 660 F. Supp. 2d 126, 129 (D.D.C. 2009).
60 See Carpenters Indus. Council,734 F. Supp. 2d 126.
61 Id. at 130.
62 Id. at 131.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 134.
65 Carpenters Indus. Council v. Salazar, 734 F. Supp. 2d 126, 136 (D.D.C. 2010).
58
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under the [APA], repeal a rule without public notice and comment,
without judicial consideration of the merits.”66 The Court thus left
the flawed rule in place, allowing the timber industry to reap the
benefits of environmental deregulation.67
Some commentators have since jumped to the conclusion that
courts categorically lack the authority to vacate rules prior to a
conclusive merits determination.68 But that reasoning mistakenly
assumes that the APA limits the court’s equitable authority, when
it does not as explained below in Section IV. Despite pressing this
false argument, commentators acknowledged that it would lead to
inequitable outcomes: courts would presumptively grant voluntary
remands, all while being forced to leave in place unlawful rules
that cause serious harm to the public.69
B. The Biden Administration’s Attempts to Circumvent the
Court’s Authority to Vacate Rules on Voluntary Remand
Over the past year, the Biden Administration has sought
voluntary remands of multiple, Trump-era environmental
regulations.70 Across these requests, the Biden Administration has
consistently declined to address whether the rules should be
vacated on remand.71 The Government instead has vaguely
suggested that the courts must leave the rules in place,
notwithstanding the harms to the environment.
The Biden Administration pursued this strategy in response
to the multiple lawsuits challenging the Trump-era Navigable
Id. at 135–36.
Id. at 136–37 (the court also denied the environmental groups’ request to
proceed with partial summary judgment briefing, effectively insulating the rule
from judicial review).
68 See Revesz, supra note 17, at 390.
69 Id. at 402–03 (acknowledging that courts grant voluntary remands without
considering the costs of remand without vacatur).
70 See generally Pasqua Yaqui Tribe v. United States EPA, 557 F. Supp. 3d 949,
956 (D. Ariz. 2021) (explaining that federal defendants moved for voluntary
remand of the Navigable Waters Protection Rule); In re Clean Water Act
Rulemaking, 568 F. Supp. 3d 1013, 1017–18 (N.D. Cal. 2021) (N.D. Cal. Oct. 21,
2021) (“Plaintiff states, tribes, and non-profit conservation groups have
challenged EPA’s Clean Water Act certification rule, and now EPA moves to
remand the proceedings without vacatur.”).
71 See generally, Pascua Yaqui Tribe, 557 F. Supp. 3d at 954–56 (for review of
court decisions regarding whether agency actions should be vacated); see also In
re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, 568 F. Supp. 3d at 1021–23.
66
67
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Waters Protection Rule.72 For example, in Pascua Yaqui Tribe v.
EPA, a coalition of Native American tribes challenged the rule on
the grounds that it adopted an unlawfully narrow definition of
waters of the United States.73 In lieu of defending the rule, the
agencies sought a voluntary remand on the grounds that the rule
suffered from serious legal errors and was causing significant
environmental harm.74 Nonetheless, the Government refused to
address the issue of vacatur—the presumptive remedy that would
accompany the requested remand.75 Instead, the Government
ignored the issue and sought a remand without vacatur so that it
could continue to apply the rule at record-setting pace, thereby
risking further harms to the environment and tribes.76
The Biden Administration took the same approach in the
trifecta of lawsuits challenging the Trump-era Clean Water Act
Section 401 Certification Rule. There, the Environmental
Protection Agency (“EPA”) promulgated a rule that gutted the
See Definition of Waters of the United States, 33 C.F.R. § 328 (2022). Multiple
parties challenged the rule in various district courts. See generally, e.g., N.M.
Cattle Growers’ Ass’n v. EPA, No. 1:19-CV-00988 (D.N.M. Oct. 22, 2019); Or.
Cattlemen’s Ass’n v. EPA, 3:19-CV-00564 (D. Or. Apr. 16, 2019); Pueblo of Laguna
v. Regan, No. 1:21-CV-00277, 2021 WL 4290179 (D.N.M Sept. 21, 2021); Navajo
Nation v. Regan, No. 20-CV-602-MV/GJF, 2021 WL 4430466 (D.N.M Sept. 27,
2021.); California v. Wheeler, No. 20-CV-03005-RS, 2020 WL 4916601 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 13, 2020); Waterkeeper All. v. Regan, No. 18-CV-03521-RS, 2021 WL
4221585 (N.D. Cal Sept. 16, 2021); Colorado v. EPA, No. 1:20-CV-01461 (D. Colo.
May 22, 2020); Env’t Integrity Project v. Wheeler, No. 20-CV-1734, 2021 WL
6844257 (D.D.C. Jan. 27, 2021); Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Wheeler, No. 1:20-CV01064 (consolidated with 1:20-CV-01063) (D. Md. Apr. 27, 2020); Conservation L.
Found. v. EPA, No. 1:20-CV-10820 (D. Mass. Apr. 29, 2020); Murray v. Wheeler,
No. 1:19-CV-01498 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2019); S.C. Coastal Conservation League v.
Regan, No. 2:20-CV-01687-BHH, 2021 WL 3886152 (D.S.C. May 21, 2021); Puget
Soundkeeper All. v. EPA, No. 2:20-CV-00950 (W.D. Wash. June 22, 2020); Wash.
Cattlemen’s Ass’n v. EPA, No. C19-0569-JCC, 2019 WL 3206052 (W.D. Wash.
July 16, 2019).
73 The Tribes moved for summary judgment on their claims challenging the
Navigable Waters Protection Rule. See Pascua Yaqui Tribe, 557 F. Supp. 3d at
951.
74 See id. at 954.
75 Id. (“The Agency Defendants have not requested vacatur”). The agency
defendants later denied the court’s authority to order vacatur prior to a merits
determination but provided no analysis or argument to support this position.
76 See Pasqua Yaqui Tribe v. EPA, No. CV-20-00266-TUC-RM, 2021 WL 4844323,
at *2 (D. Ariz. Apr. 12, 2021) (documenting “Defendants’ active implementation
of that rule, including at the Rosemont Mine site in the Santa Rita Mountains
southeast of Tucson.”).
72
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authority of States and Tribal governments to apply key
environmental protections to ensure compliance with local water
quality requirements.77 Because of the significant harms to fiscal
and natural resources posed by that rule, states, tribes, and
environmental groups filed multiple lawsuits seeking vacatur of
the rule.78 Before litigation could reach the merits, however, EPA
stopped in its tracks. It announced its intent to revisit the rule to
“restore” the federal-state balance enshrined within the Clean
Water Act.79 Also, EPA asked the district court to remand the rule,
but again refused to address the issue of vacatur. Instead, EPA
“neglected to address why the instant action is the exception
meriting remand without vacatur or why the default standard of
vacatur . . . should not apply here.”80 Industry, in turn, seized on
this omission and argued the court could not vacate the rule
because the Government did not ask for such relief.81 This
argument would have forced the court to leave the rule in place on
remand, despite its substantive flaws and the serious risk of
irreparable environmental injury.
These cases reveal a concerted effort by the Biden
Administration to divorce remand from the associated remedy of
vacatur. That strategy, however, overlooked the court’s equitable
authority to vacate the agencies’ rules on voluntary remand.
PART III. THE COURT’S LONG-STANDING AUTHORITY TO
VACATE RULES ON VOLUNTARY REMAND
The Supreme Court has consistently reaffirmed its “broader”
and “more flexible” authority to order such relief as necessary to
“protect the public interest” and do “full justice to all the real
parties in interest.”82 Vacating an agency rule on a pre-merits
request for voluntary remand is a proper exercise of this wellSee 40 C.F.R § 121 (2022).
See In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, 568 F. Supp. 3d 1013, 1018 (N.D. Cal.
2021).
79 See Notice of Intention to Reconsider and Revise the Clean Water Act Section
401 Certification Rule, 86 Fed. Reg. 29541 (proposed June 2, 2021) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 121).
80 In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, 568 F. Supp. 3d at 1018.
81 Intervenor Defendants' Reply in Support of Motion to Strike at 2, In re Clean
Water Act Rulemaking, 568 F. Supp. 3d 1013, 1014 (N.D. Cal. 2021) (No. 20-CV0436), 2021 WL 4924844, at *5.
82 Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398, 400 (1946).
77
78
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established equitable authority and necessary to avoid injustice
when voluntary remand thwarts judicial review. Nothing in the
APA strips the court of this authority.
A.

Courts Have Broad Equitable Authority to Vacate
Agency Actions on Voluntary Remand.

When an agency files a motion for a voluntary remand, it seeks
an extraordinary form of equitable relief—an order that effectively
terminates the lawsuit, as discussed above.83 Courts have the
power to vacate a rule on such a motion, lest the challengers of the
rule be left subject to a rule they claim is invalid and causes serious
harm.84 Only in that way can courts of “equity do complete rather
than truncated justice.”85
The Supreme Court identified the roots of this equitable
authority in Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB.86 There, the Court
analogized the voluntary remand of an agency action to the
“familiar appellate practice” of remanding a case to a district court
“for further proceedings without deciding the merits.”87 In such a
scenario, the appellate court can and often does set aside the lower
court’s decision. That same approach applies to the voluntary
remand of agency actions prior to a merits determination. The
court can either vacate the agency action or allow the agency itself
to vacate the rule on remand, “[i]n either event the findings and
order are vacated.”88
Consistent with this authority, lower courts have repeatedly
vacated agency rules on voluntary remand, to guard against harms
to public interest and the environment. Equity often requires such
See Cent. Power & Light Co. v. United States, 634 F.2d 137, 145 (5th Cir. 1980);
see also supra Section II(A) and accompanying notes (discussing the exceptional
remedy of voluntary remand).
84 See Chlorine Chem. Council v. EPA, 206 F.3d 1286, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(denied motion for voluntary remand without vacatur).
85 Porter, 328 U.S. at 398.
86 Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 364, 372 (1939).
87 Id. at 373.
88 Id. at 375; see Tyler v. Fitzsimmons, 990 F.2d 28, 32 n.3 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding
that courts have long recognized the “‘inherent’ authority” of a reviewing court “to
condition its remand order as it deems appropriate”); see also Ind. & Mich. Elec.
Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 502 F.2d 336, 346 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (holding that when
reviewing actions of administrative agencies, courts have the power to adjust
relief to exigencies of the case).
83
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a remedy: “[l]eaving an agency action in place while the agency
reconsiders may deny the petitioners the opportunity to vindicate
their claims in federal court and would leave them subject to a rule
they have asserted is invalid.”89 Thus, rather than waiting for the
agency to withdraw a flawed rule on remand—a process that can
take years90—courts can and do vacate the agency action to avert
additional harm during remand.91
Courts have applied the familiar, two-part test from AlliedSignal, Inc. v. U.S. NRC to evaluate the equities of vacating an
agency action on voluntary remand.92 Under Allied-Signal, the
“decision whether to vacate depends on [1] the seriousness of the
order’s deficiencies (and thus the extent of doubt whether the
agency chose correctly) and [2] the disruptive consequences of an
interim change that may itself be changed.”93 Courts typically
In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, 568 F. Supp. 3d at 1021.
Anne Joseph O'Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait
of the Modern Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889, 958–59 (2008) (finding
that it takes many agencies almost two years after issuing a notice of proposed
rulemaking to complete a final rule).
91 See, e.g., Safer Chemicals, Healthy Families v. EPA, 791 F. App'x 653, 656 (9th
Cir. 2019); Center for Biological Diversity v. Haaland, No. 19-cv-05206-JLT, 2022
WL 2444455 (N.D. Cal. July 5, 2022); In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, 568 F.
Supp. 3d 1013 (N.D. Cal. 2021); Pasqua Yaqui Tribe v. United States EPA, 557 F.
Supp. 3d 949 (D. Ariz. 2021); Navajo Nation v. Regan, No. 20-CV-602-MV/GJF,
2021 WL 4430466, at *3 (D.N.M. Sept. 27, 2021); Alliance for Wild Rockies v.
Marten, No. CV-17-21-M-DLC, 2018 WL 2943251, at *2–3 (D. Mont. June 12,
2018); ASSE Int'l, Inc. v. Kerry, 182 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1064 (9th Cir. 2015); Ct.
For Native Ecosystems v. Salazar, 795 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1241–42 (D. Colo. 2010);
N. Coast Rivers All. v. DOI, No. 1:16-CV-00307-LJO-MJS, 2016 WL 8673038, at
*6 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2016) (acknowledging authority to vacate rule on motion for
voluntary remand but declining to do so after balancing equities); NRDC v. DOI,
275 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1143 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (holding that "the same equitable
analysis for vacatur of the rules" applies on motions for voluntary remand but
declining to exercise that equitable authority); but see Alaska Wildlife All. v.
Haaland, No. 3:20-CV-00209-SLG, 2022 WL 1553556, at *3 (D. Alaska May 17,
2022) (“Given the Supreme Court's recent stay order and the dearth of Ninth
Circuit authority on the matter, the Court is not persuaded that it has the
authority to vacate the challenged agency action absent a merits determination.”).
92 Allied-Signal, Inc. v. NRC, 988 F.2d 146, 150–51 (D.C. Cir. 1993); In re Clean
Water Act Rulemaking, 568 F. Supp. 3d at 1022 (applying “the familiar AlliedSignal test” to evaluate pre-merits vacatur); Pasqua Yaqui Tribe v. United States
EPA, 557 F. Supp. 3d at 954 (following the Ninth Circuit’s analogue of Allied
Signal in evaluating vacatur).
93 Allied-Signal, Inc., 988 F.2d at 150–151; see Cal. Cmtys. Against Toxics v. EPA,
688 F.3d 989, 992 (9th Cir. 2012) (multiple circuit courts have adopted the AlliedSignal test for evaluating vacatur after a merits determination).
89
90
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vacate the challenged rule under this test; the courts only leave
agency actions in place “when equity demands,” such as to prevent
serious environmental harm.94
Allied-Signal provides a useful framework for assessing the
equities prior to a merits determination.95 The test first arose out
of the preliminary injunction context where courts evaluate the
appropriate remedy based on the likelihood of success on the
merits.96 The first Allied-Signal prong turns on the “extent of
doubt whether the agency chose correctly,” which is established in
multiple ways.97 Courts can consider the degree to which the
agency action contravenes the purposes of the statute in question,
whether the same rule could be adopted on remand, and whether
the action was the result of reasoned decision making.98 Conclusive
findings of agency error are sufficient but not necessary to vacate
an agency rule on voluntary remand.99
Courts have relied on multiple lines of evidence and argument
to assess the seriousness of the errors in the challenged rule.
Courts often start the inquiry by assessing the underlying record,
including the text and preamble of the rule itself.100 Courts can also
consider declarations provided by the agencies documenting the
errors in the agency action that warrant voluntary remand, as
those same errors inform the vacatur analysis. 101 When needed,
the court can request additional briefing on the extent of the errors
or disruptive consequences of vacatur.102 In addition, courts can

Cal. Cmtys. Against Toxics, 688 F.3d at 992; see also supra text WHAT? and
accompanying note 52.
95 In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, 568 F. Supp. 3d at 1023.
96 Id.; see also ASSE Int’l, Inc., 182 F. Supp. 3d at 1064 (“[c]ourts faced with a
motion for voluntary remand employ ‘the same equitable analysis’ courts use to
decide whether to vacate agency action after a ruling on the merits”).
97 Allied-Signal, Inc., 988 F.2d at 150–51.
98 See Pollinator Stewardship Council v. EPA, 806 F.3d 520, 532 (9th Cir. 2015).
99 In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, 568 F. Supp. 3d at 1022.
100 See id. (explaining that the court properly focused on the final rule and its
preamble in finding serious errors).
101 Id. at *9. Upon a motion for voluntary remand, moreover, evaluations of
remand and vacatur do not occur in isolation from one another; see Safer Chems.,
Healthy Families v. EPA, 791 F. App’x 653, 656 (9th Cir. 2019); Pollinator
Stewardship Council, 806 F.3d at 532–33 (9th Cir. 2015); Cal. Cmtys. Against
Toxics v. EPA, 688 F.3d 989, 993–94 (9th Cir. 2012).
102 See In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, 568 F. Supp. 3d at 1023.
94
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evaluate the parties’ arguments on the merits, such as when
agencies seek voluntary remand during or after merits briefing.103
In some cases, an agency might admit error as part of a
request for voluntary remand.104 While that can help demonstrate
serious errors warranting vacatur,105 it is not a prerequisite for
vacatur. Courts find serious errors, even where the agency “does
not admit fault.”106 For example, in California Coalition Against
Toxics, EPA sought a voluntary remand of an ambient air quality
standard, all while maintaining the standard was not arbitrary
and capricious based on new reasoning.107 The Ninth Circuit
rejected that impermissible, post-hoc argument, finding the
standard was invalid—a substantive error supporting vacatur.108
By undertaking a robust review under the first prong of Allied
Signal, courts can guard against gamesmanship by the agencies.
For example, an agency might seek voluntary remand without
conceding error to evade vacatur of the challenged action. Such
silence is not an impediment to vacating the challenged action;
otherwise, the agency would have veto power over the court’s
remedial authority.109 Alternatively, an agency might summarily
concede error to obtain prompt vacatur of a challenged rule, but
such conclusory statements are not determinative, either.110
Therefore, it is not the act of conceding error that matters, but
rather the seriousness of the errors underlying the challenged rule,

See Pasqua Yaqui Tribe v. United States EPA, No. CV-20-00266-TUC-RM,
2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 203490, at *3 (D. Ariz. Apr. 12, 2021) (summarizing tribal
plaintiffs’ merits arguments challenging Navigable Waters Protection Rule); see
also Navajo Nation v. Regan, 20-CV-602-MV/GJF, 2021 WL at 4430466, at *3
(D.N.M. Sept. 27, 2021).
104 Safer Chemicals 791 F. App’x at 656 (granting a request by the EPA for
voluntary remand with vacatur after finding that the request was not frivolous
or made in bad faith).
105 See In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, 568 F. Supp. 3d at 1021.
106 Id. at 1026; see also Ctr. for Native Ecosystems v. Salazar, 795 F. Supp. 2d
1236, 1242 (D. Co. 2011). Courts often refuse to uncritically accept an agency’s
concession of error. See Mexichem Specialty Resins, Inc. v. EPA, 787 F.3d 544,
557 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
107 Cal. Cmtys. Against Toxics v. EPA, 688 F.3d 989, 992 (9th Cir. 2012).
108 Id. at 993.
109 See generally In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, 568 F. Supp. 3d.
110 See Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n, 660 F. Supp. 2d 3, 5 (D.C. 2009) (rejecting
agency’s concession of error on the grounds that it would allow the agency to
circumvent notice and comment, if the court vacated the rule).
103
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as assessed by the reviewing court under the first prong of Allied
Signal.
Courts are also well equipped to evaluate the second prong of
Allied Signal—the disruptive consequences of vacatur—prior to a
merits adjudication.111 This analysis involves weighing the harms
to the parties and public interest, an inquiry courts routinely
undertake in the context of preliminary injunctions.112 This prong
of the analysis almost always favors protecting the environment
from irreparable harm.113 Thus, even where the court finds serious
errors in a challenged rule, including where the agency concedes
error, the court can still remand the rule without vacatur so as to
ensure against irreparable environmental harm on remand.114
Courts have treated vacatur as the presumptive remedy on
motions for voluntary remand.115 That approach is appropriate,
even absent a merits determination, given the severe consequences
of voluntary remands, which preclude the plaintiffs from obtaining
a ruling on the merits even though the agency admits substantial,
if not fatal, flaws in its action.116 The burden rests on the agency to
Allied-Signal, Inc. v. NRC, 988 F.2d 146, 150–51 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
See, e.g., Winter v. NRDC, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (holding that “plaintiffs
seeking preliminary relief to demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in the
absence of an injunction”). To be clear though, the standards for vacatur and
preliminary injunctions are decidedly different. Vacatur does not require
plaintiffs to establish irreparable harm; rather, it is the agency’s burden to
demonstrate that “vacating a faulty rule could result in possible environmental
harm.” Pollinator Stewardship Council v. EPA, 806 F.3d 520, 532 (9th Cir. 2015).
Furthermore, the analysis turns on the risk of harm, not the likelihood of
irreparable harm. See also Nat’l Fam. Farm Coal. v. EPA, 960 F.3d 1120, 1144–
45 (9th Cir. 2020) (considering whether leaving the decision in place “would risk
environmental harm”).
113 See also supra textWHAT? accompanying notes 52–54.
114 Id.
115 See Pascua Yaqui Tribe v. EPA, 557 F. Supp. 3d at 955 (“the Court will apply
the ordinary test for whether remand should include vacatur”); see also ASSE Int’l
Inc. v. Kerry, 182 F. Supp. 3d 1059, 1064 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (“Courts faced with a
motion for voluntary remand employ ‘the same equitable analysis’ courts use to
decide whether to vacate agency action after a ruling on the merits”); N. Coast
Rivers All. v. DOI, No. 1:16-CV-00307-LJO-MJS, 2016 WL 8673038, at *6 (E.D.
Cal. Sept. 23, 2016) (“In deciding whether to vacate an agency action, courts . . .
have employed ‘the same equitable analysis’ used to decide whether to vacate
agency action after a ‘ruling on the merits.’”).
116 Indeed, the government routinely acknowledges that vacatur is the
presumptive remedy when it concedes error. See Respondent EPA’s Unopposed
Motion for Voluntary Vacatur and Remand at 7, California v. EPA, No. 21-1035
111
112
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demonstrate why the equities warrant leaving the action in place
on remand, such as to prevent irreversible harm to the
environment.117 Absent that, “equity does not demand the atypical
remedy of remand without vacatur.”118
In sum, courts have broad authority to vacate challenged
rules, even prior to a merits determination. The familiar AlliedSignal framework provides an important procedural safeguard for
district courts to exercise remedial authority and reach equitable
outcomes wherever an agency seeks voluntary remand.
B. The Administrative Procedure Act does not Strip Courts of
Their Equitable Power to Vacate Agency Action on Voluntary
Remand
Some courts have incorrectly assumed that the APA strips
them of their authority to vacate agency actions prior to a ruling
on the merits.119 The argument misreads the law and unduly
constrains the court’s ability to ensure equitable relief on remand.
The Supreme Court has long rejected constrains on the
court’s authority “to do equity and to mould each decree to the
necessities of the particular case.”120 Thus, courts are reluctant to
limit their equitable discretion, absent an express congressional
mandate to the contrary,121 “[u]nless a statute in so many words,
or by a necessary and inescapable inference, restricts the court’s
jurisdiction in equity, the full scope of that jurisdiction is to be
recognized and applied.”122
(D.C. Cir. Mar. 17, 2021) (explaining a request for vacatur of air quality rule
because agency conceded that it failed to provide notice and comment).
117 See Klamath-Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. NOAA, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1238, 1242
(N.D. Cal. 2015) (“Put differently, ‘courts may decline to vacate agency decisions
when vacatur would cause serious and irremediable harms that significantly
outweigh the magnitude of the agency’s error.’”).
118 See Pascua Yaqui Tribe, 557 F. Supp. 3d 956.
119 See Carpenters Indus. Council v. Salazar, 734 F. Supp. 2d 126, 135 (D.D.C.
2010); Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n, 660 F.Supp.2d 2, 5 (D.D.C. 2009).
120 Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944).
121 See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 320 (1982) (holding that “a
major departure from the long tradition of equity practice should not be lightly
implied.” Statutes should be construed “in favor of that interpretation which
affords a full opportunity for equity courts to treat enforcement proceedings . . .
in accordance with their traditional practices, as conditioned by the necessities of
the public interest which Congress has sought to protect.”).
122 Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946).
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No section in the APA prohibits courts from vacating agency
actions prior to a decision on the merits. To the contrary, the APA’s
legislative history confirms that the APA’s judicial review
provision should not be construed as “limiting or unduly expanding
judicial review.”123 The Attorney General’s Manual on the
Administrative Procedure Act (1947) also explains that the APA’s
judicial review provision is intended as “a general restatement of
the principles of judicial review embodied in many statutes and
judicial decisions.”124
Nonetheless, commentators often argue that Section 706 of
the APA expressly limits the court’s remedial discretion.125 That
section directs courts to set aside agency action “found” to be
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law,” “without observance of procedure required
by law,” or “in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or
limitations, or short of statutory right.”126 The provision is
inapposite as a court considering an agency’s request for remand—
a judicially created course of action not addressed in the APA—is
not engaging in judicial review. Remand, in fact, avoids judicial
review of the challenged rule. Thus, Section 706 does not preclude
courts from determining whether vacatur should accompany an
agency’s request for voluntary remand.
Furthermore, courts have routinely rejected the argument
that Section 706 constrains the court’s equitable discretion to set
aside agency action. Section 706(2)(A) provides that a court “shall”
set aside unlawful agency actions, suggesting that vacatur of an
unlawful agency action is mandatory after a court finds an error127
While that language may be mandatory, it is not exclusive. It “does
not expressly limit a reviewing court’s authority to set-aside an
agency’s action; it merely requires a reviewing court to do so in
certain circumstances.”128
Legislative History of the Administrative Procedure Act, Sen. Doc. No. 158,
79th Cong. 2d Sess., at 39 (1944-46).
124 TOM C. CLARK, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT (1947).
125 See, e.g., Revesz, supra note 17, at 390.
126 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).
127 See Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 35
(1998) (quoting Anderson v. Yungkau, 329 U.S. 482, 485 (1947)) (“the mandatory
‘shall’. . . normally creates an obligation impervious to judicial discretion”).
128 Ctr. For Native Ecosystems v. Salazar, 795 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1241 (D. Colo.
2011).
123
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Courts have consistently held that vacatur is a discretionary
remedy entrusted to their sound equitable discretion, even under
Section 706.129 For example, courts have repeatedly held, when
equity demands, a flawed rule need not be vacated, even where it
is found to be arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.130 The
vacatur power is not therefore limited to the provisions of the APA
but rests in the sound equitable discretion of the court.131 That
same reasoning supports the corollary proposition, namely that
the court retains discretion to vacate a rule prior to establishing a
definitive error. 132 One court succinctly explained this point with
the following syllogism, “because vacatur is an equitable remedy,
and because the APA does not expressly preclude the exercise of
equitable jurisdiction, the APA does not preclude the granting of
vacatur without a decision on the merits.”133 No appellate court has

Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Bureau of Reclamation, 601 F.3d 1096, 1139
(10th Cir. 2010) (holding that “[v]acatur is an equitable remedy . . . and the
decision whether to grant vacatur is entrusted to the district court’s discretion”).
130 Many courts have held that, while “[t]he ordinary practice is to vacate unlawful
agency action,” courts retain equitable discretion to “not vacate the action but
instead remand for the agency to correct its errors” in certain limited
circumstances. United Steel v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 925 F.3d 1279, 1287
(D.C. Cir. 2019); see also Pollinator Stewardship Council v. EPA, 806 F.3d 520,
522, 532 (9th Cir. 2015) (discussing equitable considerations requiring remand
with vacatur); Cal. Cmtys. Against Toxics v. EPA, 688 F.3d 989, 992 (9th Cir.
2012) (discussing equitable considerations requiring remand without vacatur).
This practice underscores that the decision to vacate or retain administrative
actions rests in the sound equitable discretion of the court.
131 Professor Levin examined the court’s equitable authority to remand without
vacatur, even in the face of the APA’s mandate to set aside agency action found
arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. Ronald M. Levin, “Vacation” at Sea:
Judicial Remedies and Equitable Discretion in Administrative Law, 53 DUKE L.J.
291, 323–29 (2003). He concluded that the Administrative Procedure Act should
not be read literally as that would constrain the court’s discretion to adjust its
relief to the exigencies of the circumstances.
132 See Ctr. For Native Ecosystems, 795 F. Supp. 2d at 1241 n.8 (explaining how
the equitable principles identified by Professor Levin support pre-merits vacatur);
see also In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, No. C 20-04636 WHA, 2021 WL
5792968, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2021).
133 In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, 568 F. Supp. 3d at 1022 (quoting Ctr. for
Native Ecosystems, 795 F. Supp. 2d at 1241–42).
129
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disavowed that logic as doing so would unduly constrain equity
jurisdiction.134
Nonetheless, some district courts have refused to order premerits vacatur on the grounds that such relief would violate the
notice and comment requirements of APA.135 The argument is
unfounded as that requirement does not bind the court.136 It also
assumes vacating a rule prior to the merits would allow agencies
to end-run their notice and comment obligations.137 But vacatur is
not a fait accompli; the court must assess whether to remand with
vacatur based on the two-prong Allied Signal test, which
safeguards against strategic behavior by agencies.138 Therefore,
courts can take into consideration concerns about agencies
circumventing the APA, but that is not a categorical basis for
categorically denying the court’s authority to order pre-merits
vacatur.139
Sovereign immunity is not a jurisdictional bar to pre-merits
vacatur either.140 Section 702 of the APA141 is intended broadly to
“eliminate the sovereign immunity defense in all equitable actions
for specific relief against a Federal agency or officer.”142
Furthermore, vacatur only arises when the agency files a motion
for voluntary remand, thereby invoking the court’s equitable
authority to fashion an appropriate remedy, including remand
with vacatur.143 Even when the court vacates the agency rule, it
To the contrary, appellate courts have implicitly affirmed their authority to
vacate rules prior to a merits determination. Safer Chemicals, Healthy Families
v. EPA, 791 F. App’x 653, 656 (9th Cir. 2019); Cal. Cmtys. Against Toxics v. EPA,
688 F.3d 989, 992–94 (9th Cir. 2012) (evaluating vacatur on motion for voluntary
remand).
135 See Carpenters Indus. Council v. Salazar, 734 F. Supp. 2d 126 (D.D.C. 2010).
136 See Ctr. for Native Ecosystems Council, 795 F. Supp. 2d at 1241 n.6 (“a court’s
decision to vacate an agency’s action is not subject to the APA[’s]” notice-andcomment requirements).
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 See discussion infra Section V (discussing contrasting policy concerns raised
by pre-merits vacatur, all of which can be considered by the courts through the
Allied-Signal framework).
140 See In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, 568 F. Supp. 3d 1013 (N.D. Cal. 2021)
(rejecting theory that sovereign immunity precludes pre-merits vacatur).
141 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012).
142 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1656, at 9 (1976) (Conf. Rep.) (emphasis added).
143 E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Biden, 993 F.3d 640, 681 (9th Cir. 2021)
(Agencies understand that “[s]ingular equitable relief,” such as vacatur of a
nationwide rule, “is ‘commonplace’ in APA cases”).
134
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does not issue any binding determinations that would constrain
the agency or encroach on its decision making functions on
remand. Instead, the court returns the case to the agency “in order
that it may take further action in accordance with the applicable
law.”144 The agency thus escapes a potentially adverse ruling on
the merits and is free to reevaluate its decision.145
In this light, it is inaccurate to characterize pre-merits vacatur
as affording plaintiffs complete relief without ever having to prove
their case. While the court sets aside the agency action due to the
seriousness of the errors and disruptive consequences, it does not
issue any definitive rulings that constrain the agency’s options on
remand. Pre-merits vacatur is not therefore a complete victory for
plaintiffs; nor is it a complete loss for the agency. Both sides
survive to fight another day.
By contrast, stripping courts of their authority to order
vacatur on motions for voluntary remand leads to one-sided
inequitable outcomes. Agencies would be able to obtain voluntary
remands under the permissive framework adopted by courts
without any risk of vacatur. This process would allow agencies to
“snatch a temporary victory from the jaws of defeat” and insulate
a possibly unlawful rule from judicial review, even when such an
outcome would cause severe harm.146 To guard against such an
inequitable outcome, courts retain the longstanding authority to
voluntarily remand challenged rules with vacatur and thereby
check administrative agencies seeking to escape judicial review.
Again, nothing in the APA demonstrates a clear intent to depart
from this long tradition of equity practice.
PART IV. THE POLICY JUSTIFICATION FOR VACATING RULES
ON A MOTION FOR VOLUNTARY REMAND
Courts have broad authority to order vacatur on motions for
voluntary remand prior to a merits determination. But doing so
raises contrasting policy implications, which may lead courts to

Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 364, 374 (1939).
See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 514 (2009) (explaining
that agency must provide reasoned basis for reversing prior decision).
146 Revesz, supra note 17 at 369–70 (discussing prejudice to plaintiffs due to
voluntary remands without vacatur).
144
145
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differing outcomes based on the facts of each case.147 Three policy
considerations, however, weigh heavily in favor of pre-merits
vacatur of insufficiently protective environmental regulations: (1)
preventing serious environmental harm on remand, (2) ensuring
access to the courts, and (3) saving judicial resources. These
considerations were at the forefront of two recent decisions
vacating and remanding Trump-era regulations that eliminated
longstanding Clean Water Act protections.148
A.

Pre-Merits Vacatur Prevents Serious Environmental
Harm That Would Otherwise Occur During A
Voluntary Remand.

Environmental injury is “often permanent or at least of long
duration, i.e., irreparable.”149 Leaving an inadequate rule in place
can cause serious, irreversible environmental harm on remand.
That concern is particularly acute given that it often takes
agencies two years, if not longer, to reconsider and reverse a flawed
rule.150 Vacatur is an expeditious way to prevent years worth of
irreversible harm.151
Also, vacatur dovetails with the policy goals underlying
environmental statutes. For example, the Clean Water Act
(“CWA”) has the express goal “to restore and maintain the
See In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, 568 F. Supp. 3d at 1022 (noting
“[c]ontrasting policy” implications of pre-merits vacatur). Compare Ctr. For
Native Ecosystems v. Salazar, 795 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1241–42 (D. Colo. 2011),
with Carpenters Indus. Council v. Salazar, 734 F. Supp. 2d 126, 135–36 (D.D.C.
2010).
148 See Pascua Yaqui Tribe v. U.S. EPA, 557 F. Supp. 3d 949 (D. Ariz. 2021); In re
Clean Water Act Rulemaking, 568 F. Supp. 3d at 1022.
149 Amoco Prod. Co. v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 545 (1987).
150 See O’Connell, supra note 90, at 964. More recent examples confirm these
findings. For example, on June 6, 2021, the Biden Administration stated its intent
to replace the Trump-era Clean Water Act Certification Rule. See Notice of
Intention to Reconsider and Revise the Clean Water Act Section 401 Certification
Rule, 86 Fed. Reg. 29,541 (June 2, 2021) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt 121). The
Administration explained that it did not anticipate finalizing a revised rule until
Spring 2023 at the earliest, a delay of almost two years. See In re Clean Water Act
Rulemaking, 568 F. Supp. 3d 1020 (documenting anticipated delay). In the
lawsuits challenging the Navigable Waters Protection Rule, the agency was
unable to provide a timeline for replacing that rule.
151 See Pollinator Stewardship Council v. EPA, 806 F.3d 520, 522, 532 (9th Cir.
2015) (vacating a challenged rule as leaving the rule in place “risks more potential
environmental harm than vacating it”).
147
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chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s
waters.”152 The ESA commands federal agencies to “insure” that
their actions “do not jeopardize” the continued existence of a
threatened or endangered species.153 Leaving a flawed rule in place
on remand (e.g., one that exposes the Nation’s waters to
degradation or endangered species to jeopardy) is antithetical to
those statutory mandates. For that reason, appellate courts have
focused on environmental consequences when assessing whether
to remand a rule with or without vacatur.154
Preventing serious environmental injury was a driving reason
behind two recent decisions that remanded and vacated the
Navigable Waters Protection Rule.155 There, the courts granted the
government’s request for a voluntary remand while
simultaneously vacating the rule to stem any further “serious
environmental harms.”156 The courts found that vacatur was
necessary to prevent “cascading downstream effects” attributable
to the rule, including “effects on water supplies, water quality,
flooding, drought, erosion, and habit integrity.”157 These harms
would disproportionately affect the plaintiff tribes of the arid
southwest, who have relied on clean water since time
immemorial.158 As the courts further noted, “[s]uch pollution and

33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012).
16 U.S.C. § 1536 (2012) (directing all federal agencies “to insure that actions
authorized, funded, or carried out by them do not jeopardize the continued
existence” of an endangered species or “result in the destruction or modification
of habitat of such species . . . .”); see also Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153,
180 (1978) (describing the Endangered Species Act as “the most comprehensive
legislation for the preservation of endangered species ever enacted by any
nation”).
154 See Pollinator Stewardship Council, 806 F.3d at 532 (vacating a challenged
rule where leaving the rule in place “risks more potential environmental harm
than vacating it”); Idaho Farm Bureau Fed’n, 58 F.3d 1392, 1405–06 (9th Cir.
1995) (choosing not to vacate because vacatur would risk potential extinction of a
snail); Cal. Cmtys. Against Toxics v. EPA, 688 F.3d 989, 994 (9th Cir. 2012)
(choosing not to vacate because vacatur could lead to air pollution).
155 See Pascua Yaqui Tribe v. U.S. EPA, 557 F. Supp. 3d 949, 955 (D. Ariz. 2021);
Navajo Nation v. Regan, 20-CV-602-MV/GJF, 2021 WL at 4430466, at *5 (D.N.M.
Sept. 27, 2021).
156 See Pascua Yaqui Tribe, 557 F. Supp. 3d at 955–56; Navajo Nation, 2021 WL
at 4430466 at *4.
157 Navajo Nation, 2021 WL at 4430466 at *4; Pascua Yaqui Tribe, 557 F. Supp.
3d at 953.
158 Navajo Nation, 2021 WL at 4430466 at *4.
152
153
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destruction cannot easily be undone.”159 Pre-merits vacatur are
thus essential to prevent serious harm, as the agencies candidly
admitted.160
Environmental protection was also at the forefront of a recent
decision vacating a Trump-era rule that limited state and tribal
government’s authority to deny the necessary certification for
CWA permits.161 The court found the plaintiffs in that case—
states, tribes, and environmental organizations—would suffer
“significant environmental harm” including harms that would
endure for a generation, should the court remand the rule without
vacatur.162 Rather than endorsing that outcome—an outcome that
“contravenes the structure and purpose of the [CWA]”—the court
vacated the rule, thereby restoring long-standing safeguards on
remand.163
Across these cases, pre-merits vacatur prevented further
environmental harm while also providing the regulated
community with regulatory certainty. As both courts noted, the
agencies planned to reconsider and replace the Trump-era rules
due to their serious flaws.164 Vacatur expedited that outcome by
reinstating the prior regulatory regime and providing industry

Id.
The defendant agencies provided declarations documenting the serious harms
posed by the Navigable Waters Protection Rule during the year it was in effect.
See Pascua Yaqui Tribe, 557 F. Supp. 3d at 950–51 (summarizing agencies’
declarations). They have since provided additional analysis demonstrating how
the Navigable Waters Protection Rule irreparably harmed the nation’s waters in
violation of the Clean Water Act—harms that would have continued unabated
absent vacatur. See Revised Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 86 Fed.
Reg. 69,372, 69,407–16 (proposed Dec. 7, 2021) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt.
120).
161 In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, 568 F. Supp. 3d 1013, 1027 (N.D. Cal.
2021).
162 Id.
163 Id. at 1026. The Supreme Court subsequently stayed the district court’s order
“insofar as it vacates the current certification rule,” pending disposition of the
appeal in the Ninth Circuit and a timely petition for a writ of certiorari, if sought.
See Louisiana v. American Rivers, 142 S. Ct. 1347, 1347 (2022). The Court did not
provide any rational for its ruling.
164 In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, 568 F. Supp. 3d 1013, 1026 (N.D. Cal.
2021); Pascua Yaqui Tribe v. EPA, 557 F. Supp. 3d 949, 953 (D. Ariz. 2021).
159
160
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with a familiar framework for complying with the CWA.165 In this
way, pre-merits vacatur reduced the uncertainties associated with
regulatory change on remand.166
Pre-merits vacatur also foreclosed any misplaced reliance
interests on the flawed rules, which were only in place for a short
period of time.167 For example, in In re Clean Water Act
Rulemaking, the court rejected industry’s contention that it had
relied on the 2020 CWA Certification Rule, “[t]he 2020 rule was in
effect for thirteen months — and under attack since before day one
— too brief and unsettled a time for justifiable reliance to build
up.”168 To foreclose any justifiable reliance, the court promptly
vacated the rule on remand.169 That would not have been possible,
had the court been powerless to vacate the rule on remand or been
obligated to delay relief for months pending a merits ruling.
None of these cases involved a situation where the agency was
attempting to use vacatur to reinstate a regulatory regime that
was insufficiently protective or out of compliance with an
environmental statute. In such a scenario, environmental
protection would provide a compelling, if not overriding, basis to
deny pre-merits vacatur. Indeed, courts have withheld vacatur in
such situations to avoid a regulatory void and the associated
environmental harm.170 Preventing serious harm is thus a weighty
factor in the court’s assessment, and one that can be achieved by
promptly vacating insufficiently protective environmental rules on
voluntary remand.

In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, 568 F. Supp. 3d at 1027 (explaining that
returning to the prior regulatory regime, which it had been in for decades, would
be “less disruptive” than leaving the flawed, Trump-era rule in place); see also
Pascua Yaqui, 557 F. Supp. 3d at 956 (explaining that Industry failed to identify
any harm from returning to the prior regulatory regime, which was “familiar” and
had been in place for decades).
166 As courts have noted, regulatory uncertainty typically attends vacatur of any
rule and is insufficient to justify remand without vacatur. Pascua Yaqui, 557 F.
Supp. 3d at 956 (pre-merits vacatur mitigated those concerns by returning
promptly to “familiar” regulatory regimes that had been in place for decades).
167 To establish a property interest protected by due process, an entity must “have
a legitimate claim of entitlement to it,” rather than “a unilateral expectation of
it.” See Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
168 In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, 568 F. Supp. 3d at 1027.
169 Id. at 1028–29 (declining to stay order vacating Clean Water Act Certification
Rule).
170 See supra notes 50-54 and associated text WHAT? – differs from FN 94 & 113.
165
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B. Pre-Merits Vacatur Ensures Access to the Courts.
Public-interest environmental litigation depends upon the
public’s access to the courts, including the opportunity to obtain
“complete rather than truncated justice.”171 Voluntary remands
without vacatur run contrary to that principle—they deprive
litigants of their day in court and subject them to harmful rules on
remand with no recourse. Pre-merits vacatur is thus essential to
mitigate that result and provide litigants with singular relief, as is
“commonplace in APA cases.”172
Ensuring access to the court was at the forefront of In re Clean
Water Act Rulemaking. There, EPA asked the district court to
remand the CWA Certification Rule without vacatur, which would
have cut off judicial review with no relief to the plaintiffs, states,
tribes, or environmental organizations. The court expressed
concern that leaving the challenged rule in place on remand would
“deny the petitioners the opportunity to vindicate their claims in
federal court and would leave them subject to a rule they have
asserted is invalid.”173 Indeed, the court identified this concern as
“more pertinent than the competing concern” of an agency
repealing a rule without public notice and comment.174
Access to the courts was also a driving concern in Pasqua
Yaqui Tribe, where the government tried twice to deny the plaintiff
tribes their day in court. There, the defendant agencies first
attempted to stay the litigation challenging the Navigable Waters
Protection Rule, all while the agencies continued to apply the rule
at record setting pace to strip longstanding CWA protections.175
The court rejected the request, noting the requested stay would
force the plaintiff tribes to “idly stand by while the Agencies fully
apply and actively implement” the rule “to the detriment of the
Tribes’ and the Nation’s waters.”176 Despite that ruling, the
agencies then sought an even harsher remedy: voluntary remand
of the rule coupled with dismissal of the Tribes’ claims challenging
Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946).
E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Biden, 993 F.3d 640, 681 (9th Cir. 2021)
(“Singular equitable relief is ‘commonplace’ in APA cases.”) (quotation omitted).
173 In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, 568 F. Supp. 3d 1013, 1021 (N.D. Cal.
2021).
174 Id.
175 Pasqua Yaqui Tribe v. United States EPA, No. CV-20-00266-TUC-RM, 2021
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 203490, at *1 (D. Ariz. Apr. 12, 2021).
176 Id. at *2 (quotations omitted).
171
172
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the rule.177 That request would have kicked the tribes out of court
without any opportunity to reach the merits—a common feature of
voluntary remands. While the court granted the government’s
request for remand and dismissal, it vacated the rule to safeguard
the Tribes’ interests and provide them with relief.178
Pre-merits vacatur does not deprive intervenor defendants of
their day in court, contrary to arguments often made by industry
groups. For example, in Pascua Yaqui Tribe, industry supported
the government’s request for a voluntary remand of the Navigable
Waters Protection Rule.179 Industry was in no position to claim
harm from obtaining that result as industry had its day in court.
Furthermore, industry’s interests were fully protected on remand
for two reasons. First, the court did not conclusively rule on the
merits or direct the agencies to take any particular action during
the forthcoming rulemaking on remand.180 Thus, the agency was
free to consider the parties’ arguments about the CWA in a new
rulemaking, including industry’s contentions. Second, industry
could participate in that rulemaking, thereby influencing the
process.181 If industry was nonetheless dissatisfied with the
resultant rule, it could file its own lawsuit and obtain its day in
court.182
In sum, pre-merits vacatur provides a crucial counterweight
against the government’s increasing use of voluntary remands to
avoid judicial review. Requesting such remands is no longer a riskPasqua Yaqui Tribe v. United States EPA, 557 F. Supp. 3d 949, 956 (D. Ariz.
2021) (in addition to the Government’s motion for voluntary remand, the
Defendant-Intervenors sought dismissal of the Tribes’ claims challenging the
Navigable Waters Protection Rule).
178 Id.
179 Id. at 951 (Industry also opposed accelerated merits briefing, foregoing its
opportunity to brief the merits before the court remanded and vacated the rule).
180 Id. at 957 (the court’s opinion did not rule on the parties’ summary judgment
motions, which were dismissed without prejudice).
181 Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 86 Fed. Reg. 69,372 (proposed Dec.
7, 2021) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. § 328 and 40 C.F.R. pt. 120) (after the court
remanded the Navigable Waters Protection Rule, the Agencies sought notice and
comment on a proposed rule to revise the definition of waters of the United
States).
182 See Alsea Valley All. v. Dep’t of Com., 358 F.3d 1181, 1184 (9th Cir. 2004)
(holding that remand orders are not generally appealable by non-agency parties);
see also Pit River Tribe v. U.S. Forest Serv., 615 F.3d 1069, 1075–77 (9th Cir.
2010) (applying and reinforcing Alsea Valley) (these reasons help explain why a
remand order is non-final for the purposes of appellate review by non-agency
litigants, such as industry intervenors).
177
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free strategy for the government. If the government asks the court
to forego a merits ruling, it may pay the price—vacatur of the
challenged rule—unless the government can demonstrate that the
equities warrant leaving that rule in place.
C. Pre-Merits Vacatur Saves Judicial and Administrative
Resources.
Courts have consistently recognized that it is often more
efficient for an agency to cure its own errors than for the court to
issue a definitive ruling on the merits.183 Pre-merits vacatur allows
this action, the court can vacate and remand a challenged rule
without going through a full adjudication and directing the agency
to take specific action on remand.184
The Government has repeatedly recognized these efficiencies
by seeking voluntary remand with vacatur in multiple rulemaking
contexts.185 The Government, however, has tried to stand as the
gatekeeper to this remedy, claiming that vacatur is only
appropriate when the Government concedes error.186 But there is
no basis for that condition precedent, which “simply puts a
different spin on [the] contention there must be some sort of
B.J. Alan Co. v. ICC, 897 F.2d 561, 563, n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (courts “have
recognized that ‘[a]dministrative reconsideration is a more expeditious and
efficient means of achieving an adjustment of agency policy than is resort to the
federal courts.’”) (quoting Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. ICC, 590 F.2d 1187,
1194 (D.C. Cir. 1978)).
184 See supra Section IV.A.
185 See Respondent EPA’s Unopposed Motion for Voluntary Vacatur and Remand
at 7, California v. EPA, No. 21-1035 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (requesting vacatur of a
Trump-era air quality rule that had been promulgated without the requisite
notice and comment); Respondent’s Consent Motion for Voluntary Vacatur and
Remand at 11–14, EDF v. EPA, No. 19-1222 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (requesting vacatur
of a Trump-era rule that relied on reasoning rejected by court in a different case);
Carpenters Indus. Council v. Salazar, 734 F. Supp. 2d 126, 135–36 (D.D.C. 2010)
(explaining that defendant agency sought remand with vacatur due to political
interference in rulemaking process);
NRDC v. DOI, 275 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1138 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (defendant agency
sought voluntary remand and vacatur of critical habitat rule).
186 See, e.g., EPA’s Final Corrected Answering Brief at 62–63, Clean Wis. v. EPA,
964 F.3d 1145 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (No. 18-1203) (arguing that court could not vacate
rule because the agency did not confess error). See also In re Clean Water Act
Rulemaking, No. C 20-04636, 2021 WL 5792968, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 2021) (industry
adopted this same argument, opposing vacatur of the Clean Water Act Section
401 Certification Rule on the grounds that the agency had not confessed error).
183
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conclusive statement regarding unlawfulness in order to set aside
an agency action.”187 The government’s flawed position would also
deprive the courts of the efficiencies to be gained from pre-merits
vacatur, while potentially causing years’ worth of additional
environmental harm on voluntary remand.188
Some commentators have acknowledged the efficiencies of
voluntary remand, but then argued they are outweighed by the
potentially severe consequences of leaving flawed rules in place.189
These commentators have thus urged courts to forego voluntary
remands and instead hold cases in abeyance pending a new
rulemaking.190 However, that recommendation simply overlooks
the court’s authority to order vacatur and ensure an efficient
equitable outcome on voluntary remand. The recommendation also
offers a false solution. While an abeyance does not deny litigants
their day in court, it instead delays judicial review, sometimes
indefinitely. Thus, the result is largely the same as a remand: the
plaintiff has no access to judicial review, even while the unlawful
rule remains in place and causes further harm. The real solution
then is not to hold the case in abeyance, but for the court to grant
the voluntary remand and vacate the challenged rule, thereby
providing efficient, expeditious, and equitable relief. The court did
just that in Pascua Yaqui Tribe when it denied the governments’
motion to hold the case in abeyance and subsequently remanded
the challenged rule with vacatur.191
Commentators have also urged courts to deny motions for
voluntary remand, apparently under the theory that the continued
threat of litigation will force the agency to act faster.192 That
approach is counterproductive for two reasons. First, it sacrifices
the efficiencies of voluntary remand by forcing the government to

In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, 2021 WL 5792968, at *4.
See supra Section IV. (discussing environmental risks of voluntary remand
without vacatur).
189 Revesz, supra note 18, at 395–404.
190 See id. at 406.
191 See supra notes 169-72 and accompanying text discussing Pascua Yaqui Tribe
procedural history.
192 Revesz, supra note 18, at 406 (courts have also adopted this approach,
essentially daring the agencies to act quicker or face the consequences of judicial
review). See Memorandum Order at 3, Clark Cnty. v. DOI (No. 11-278 (RWR)),
2012 WL 3757552, at *1 (“Neither a remand nor a stay . . . is necessary to enable
the federal defendants to review and reconsider the determination.”).
187
188
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litigate the case.193 Second, the ongoing litigation consumes agency
resources that would otherwise be spent promulgating a new rule
on remand. Denying voluntary remand can therefore delay relief,
and potentially exacerbate harms to litigants and the
environment.
National Parks Conservation Association v. Salazar
illustrates the lengthy delay and costs incurred when a court
denies voluntary remand with vacatur and instead demands a full
adjudication.194 There, a coalition of environmental groups
challenged a coal-mining rule that eliminated protections for
streams.195 Rather than defending the rule, the government sought
a voluntary remand with vacatur to fix the alleged violations of the
ESA.196 The court, however, mistakenly believed that it was
powerless to vacate the rule on a motion for voluntary remand.197
It thus denied the government’s request for a voluntary remand
and ordered merits briefing. 198 Ten months later, the government
filed a partial motion for summary judgment, conceding violations
of the ESA and requesting vacatur.199 Eight months after, the court
finally ruled on the merits and vacated the rule due to the “clear”
violations of the ESA.200 During that eighteen month delay,
however, the unlawful rule remained in place, negatively affecting
multiple endangered species and critical habitat.201 Pre-merits
vacatur would have avoided those adverse effects by providing
expeditious relief while saving precious judicial and
administrative resources.

See Am. Forest Res. Council v. Ashe, 946 F. Supp. 2d 1, 43 (D.D.C. 2013)
(because the agency did “not wish to defend” the action, “forcing it to litigate the
merits would needlessly waste not only the agency’s resources but also time that
could instead be spent correcting the rule’s deficiencies.”).
194 Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n v. Salazar, 660 F. Supp. 2d 3, 4 (D.D.C. 2009).
195 Id. at 3.
196 Id. at 4.
197 See id. at 5.
198 Id.
199 Federal Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment at 34, Nat’l Parks Ass’n v. Jewell, 965 F. Supp. 2d 67 (2013) (No. 1:09cv-00115BJR) 2013 WL 10918148.
200 Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n v. Jewell, 62 F. Supp. 3d 7, 17 (D.D.C. 2014)
(finding “clear evidence” that the agency failed to comply with Section 7 of the
Endangered Species Act).
201 Id. at 16–18 (detailing effects of coal mining operations on listed species that
depend on stream habitat).
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CONCLUSION
The Biden Administration inherited multiple lawsuits
challenging Trump-era rules that eliminated longstanding
environmental protections. Faced with this avalanche of litigation,
the Administration ran for cover and tried to get rid of the lawsuits
as quickly as possible. To that end, the Administration filed
multiple motions for voluntary remand without vacatur that would
have kicked the plaintiffs out of court and insulated the rules from
review. That knee-jerk reaction would also have locked in ever
greater ham to the very environmental resources the
Administration promised to protect.
The courts prevented such an inequitable outcome by vacating
and remanding the rules prior to a merits determination. That
remedy falls well within the heartland of the court’s authority to
do complete, rather than truncated justices. In each of these cases,
the courts carefully weighed the seriousness of the errors and the
disruptive consequences of vacating the rule on remand. That
familiar, two-step framework provides a significant procedural
safeguard for district courts to exercise their remedial authority
and reach equitable outcomes on voluntary remand that safeguard
the environment, ensure access to the court, and save judicial
resources.
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